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Friday, 20 November 2026 ·10 Jumada II 1448 AH — Jerusalem 21:22

Shenzhen Summit: Managing Great-Power Rivalry and Its Impact on Conflict Settlement in the Middle East

The strategic significance of the trilateral summit bringing together Trump, Xi Jinping and Putin in the Chinese city of Shenzhen lies not merely in the meeting of the leaders of three major nuclear powers

Adnan al-Qassas Opinion & Writers10 min read
Shenzhen Summit: Managing Great-Power Rivalry and Its Impact on Conflict Settlement in the Middle East

The strategic significance of the trilateral summit bringing together US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Chinese city of Shenzhen lies not merely in the meeting of the leaders of three major nuclear powers, but in the implications of its convening at a moment when economic competition overlaps with military conflicts and the capacity of international institutions to contain crises is receding. The central question is not whether the summit achieved a diplomatic breakthrough, but whether it marks the beginning of a transition from open rivalry to a more orderly management of differences among the major powers, and what that could mean for the international order, the Middle East and the Palestinian cause.

Many observers believe the meeting has moved beyond symbolism to something resembling the limits of understanding, as the three presidents issued a joint statement titled: “Declaration of the Presidents of the United States, Russia and China Towards Peace,” which included a commitment to reforming the United Nations, enhancing the stability of energy supplies, respecting the immunities of state officials and warning against abuse of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, alongside launching a dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and nuclear non-proliferation. However, the declaration, by contrast, was devoid of any detailed executive commitments or specific timetables, and offered no announced settlement for the war in Ukraine, the US-Iranian confrontation, or the question of the attacks Israel is waging against its neighbours in the region.

Accordingly, the summit may represent a breakthrough at the level of political communication, but it has not yet proven the existence of a comprehensive strategic consensus. Agreement on the need to avoid nuclear war does not mean agreement on managing conventional wars, and a call to reform the international order does not mean consensus on the nature of that reform or how its gains are distributed.

Here it must be noted that the three parties are most likely seeking, to varying degrees, to control the risks of rivalry without abandoning its instruments. The United States wants to preserve its leadership position and prevent its competition with China from turning into a confrontation that is difficult to contain; China seeks to consolidate its standing as an international power capable of influencing the rules of the global order; while Russia is investing its participation to affirm the continuation of its presence in international security equations, despite the pressures associated with the war in Ukraine.

Beijing has therefore achieved a diplomatic gain of significance without paying any costs on any of the substantive issues concerning states’ affairs, represented by its hosting of the meeting, as it appeared as a party capable of bringing Washington and Moscow to a single table. The value of this gain is measured not by symbolism alone, but by the extent of China’s ability to convert its diplomatic position into negotiating leverage in the files of trade, technology, energy and international security.

Here lies the advantage of the Chinese approach in its ability to combine the expansion of economic partnerships with the strengthening of strategic independence, without necessarily committing to a closed military or political alliance. Hosting the summit should therefore not be interpreted as sufficient evidence that the centre of global hegemony has shifted to Beijing, but it can be seen as an indicator of the widening of its capacity to influence the management of international rivalry.

By contrast, Washington still possesses broad economic, military and alliance tools, while Moscow retains influential capabilities in the fields of energy, deterrence and security. This in turn confirms that the closest picture is not a complete transfer of hegemony from one power to another, but rather something closer to unequal multipolarity, in which the instruments of power and influence are distributed differently.

It can be said here that the summit declaration’s implication regarding increasing the production and supply of refined petroleum products goes beyond the energy sector; it also reflects a shared awareness of the importance of stable economic flows in reducing the risks of rivalry.

Consequently, the absence of target quantities and implementation mechanisms prevents the conclusion that the leaders agreed on joint management of energy markets or on guaranteeing lower prices.

Likewise, it should be noted that diplomatic convergence does not necessarily mean the end of US-Chinese rivalry in technology, trade and supply chains. It is more likely that cooperation in areas of mutual benefit will continue, but in parallel with tighter restrictions in sectors linked to national security and technological supremacy.

In my view, this model of selective interdependence allows the major powers to achieve mutual economic gains without abandoning strategic rivalry. At the same time, it may place states with less room for manoeuvre before additional challenges, especially those that depend on the outside for energy, technology, financing and arms.

A single summit is therefore not enough to speak of a “new Yalta” or of an agreement to divide the world into spheres of influence. The declaration included no arrangements of this kind, and no consensus was established on settlements for the war in Ukraine or the files of East Asia and the Middle East.

It is worth noting, however, that the meeting may open the door to the possibility of a pattern of crisis management among the major powers developing, based on direct negotiation over shared risks while rivalry continues in other areas. This pattern and the approaches agreed upon may reduce the chances of direct confrontation, but without guaranteeing an end to existing conflicts or addressing their causes.

Here, of course, the dilemma of international legitimacy emerges. The call to reform the United Nations may reflect a real need for institutions more capable of responding to crises, but the emphasis on the immunities of state officials and the warning against abuse of international jurisdiction raise questions about the balance between sovereignty and accountability. The declaration itself does not entail any annulment of the legal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

The criterion for change will therefore not be political rhetoric alone, but the extent of the three powers’ readiness to develop practical mechanisms to reduce escalation, respect international obligations and apply legal rules without double standards, while obligating all parties to the conflict in our region to comply with international and humanitarian law, enforce UN resolutions and respect the International Criminal Court as an effective body in the field of applying international law.

On our region, it should be said that the Middle East has become one of the most important practical tests of any understanding between Washington, Beijing and Moscow, given its connection to energy security, maritime corridors and regional balances.

 In my assessment, the summit may open opportunities for de-escalation if the contacts translate into enforceable understandings on Iran and Gulf security, but the declaration did not produce an agreement of that kind, and this remains contingent on the pressing diplomatic role of regional states.

As for Israel, given that it is a major player and a central party in the conflicts raging in the region, containing regional confrontations could reduce the risks of a wide war for it, but at the same time it may not necessarily mean a change in the American position toward it or the emergence of new restrictions on its policies in any fundamental way. This matter will remain tied to Washington’s positions as well as regional balances and any subsequent understandings.

Consequently, in the Palestinian case, the declaration contains no explicit commitment regarding Gaza, ending the occupation, or pursuing a path toward establishing a Palestinian state. This is a point that should not be overlooked: convergence among major powers stipulates the stability of the international order while not guaranteeing that Palestinian justice is part of this stability’s priorities, and this is naturally unsettling for our region and its peoples, and places a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of regional states.

This does not mean that opening the door to improved relations between major powers will not lead to humanitarian and political understandings on stopping the war, aid, and reconstruction; that could materialize if political will and implementation mechanisms are available, driven by regional states. However, I believe the corresponding possibility remains present: the consolidation of temporary arrangements to manage the crisis without addressing its political roots, making de-escalation the alternative to ending the occupation and achieving self-determination.

Accordingly, it must be noted that any approach that practically expands the scope of immunities at the expense of accountability will likely weaken the political environment supportive of enforcing international law, even if the declaration itself does not change the legal status of the court or its decisions.

It is therefore possible to anticipate what will determine the direction of the next phase by envisioning the behavior of three main tracks in the near term. The first, the baseline track, consists of continued dialogue and limited cooperation among the three powers, with competition and conflicts remaining without a comprehensive settlement. The second is that the summit develops into partial understandings on some files, allowing de-escalation and opening additional diplomatic opportunities. The third is the stalling of dialogue and the continuation of military and economic escalation, reducing the summit’s impact to its symbolic limits.

Distinguishing between these tracks will depend on practical indicators, foremost among them the regularity of the nuclear dialogue, the emergence of verifiable initiatives on Ukraine and Iran, the conversion of the energy declaration into executive measures, and the emergence of specific proposals for United Nations reform. On the Palestinian file, the decisive indicator remains the extent to which any subsequent understandings are linked to stopping the war, guaranteeing aid, preventing forced displacement, ending the occupation, and preserving the unity of the Palestinian political sphere.

In conclusion, the Shenzhen summit reveals a growing recognition among major powers that managing competition has become a necessity to avoid risks that no party can contain alone. But it does not prove the emergence of a new international order, nor does it guarantee a settlement of the conflicts that threaten its stability.

Likewise, the success of major powers in managing their differences does not necessarily equal the international order’s success in achieving a just peace. The risks of direct confrontation between them may recede while conflicts persist for states and societies with less ability to influence power arrangements.

From a Palestinian perspective, the summit should not be assessed by the degree of convergence between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, but by whether this convergence will contribute to ending the war and the occupation and achieving self-determination, or will content itself with managing the crisis within balances that preserve the interests of the major powers. The strategic difference is not between a world in which major powers compete and one in which they reach understandings, but between an understanding that opens the way to just settlements and an understanding that manages conflicts without ending their causes.

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