Balance of Power in Israel After the Elections: The Separation of the Legislative and Executive Branches

The political system in the Zionist entity forms a complex constitutional architecture in which parliamentary mechanisms intersect with the calculations of government formation. In this context, constitutional law expert Dr. Matan Gutman offers an important analytical reading aimed at disentangling the widespread confusion between the results of the general elections, the swearing-in at the Knesset, and the path to forming a new government.

This analysis shows that the political map in the racist, genocidal entity is undergoing profound transformations that go beyond a mere change of names in the prime minister's office to the encirclement of the entire legislative authority.

The political landscape in the entity begins with clear numerical and demographic shifts in the election results, as the current ruling coalition lost 14 seats, with its bloc falling from 68 seats to just 54, meaning a clear loss of the parliamentary majority.

On the other hand, the opposition bloc, including the Arab parties, surged to a solid majority of 67 seats. Here lies the most important constitutional juncture Gutman points to: the Knesset does not depend in its work and powers on the formation of a government; rather, its members are sworn in within about two weeks of the elections, and the parliament begins its legislative duties immediately, regardless of any governmental deadlock.

This parliamentary independence gives the opposition, with a majority of 67 members, the immediate ability to change the rules of the game without waiting for the birth of a new government. This includes the possibility of replacing the Knesset speaker, annulling the controversial judicial overhaul laws, approving amendments to the basic laws, enacting a new military conscription law, and even advancing special legislation to establish an official commission of inquiry into the events of October 7. As a result, the outgoing government loses control over the legislative authority entirely once the new Knesset convenes.

As for the path of forming a government, it runs on a parallel and entirely separate track, beginning with consultations conducted by the president with the parliamentary blocs to task the member most likely to succeed based on the number of recommendations, not on the size of the largest party. Based on current scenarios and the likely distribution of recommendations, the mandate could go to a figure such as Gadi Eisenkot for a 28-day period that can be extended.

During this period, the mandate holder has broad political options, including negotiations with the Likud party or engineering a government that relies on a simple majority in the confidence vote, without requiring total consensus or explicit support from 61 members, since the abstention of some members from voting is enough to pass the government and pull the rug out from under the outgoing prime minister.

Reading the Zionist landscape through the lens of constitutional law reveals that the essence of the conflict has shifted from a mere battle over the prime minister's seat to a battle for control over the levers of legislation and oversight. Losing the majority in the Knesset means the ruling coalition has lost the tools of parliamentary hegemony even before an alternative government is formed, establishing a new phase marked by the undermining of past policies and the imposition of constitutional and legislative facts by the force of the new parliamentary majority.